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Germ-line genetic engineering procedures may influence the lives 
of untold millions of people far into the future. These techniques 
change the genetic material that is passed on to offspring and thus have 
the potential to change the human race as we know it. Because the 
effects are so enduring, this powerful technique must be used with 
caution. We must decide how to ethically evaluate potential changes to 
the germ-line consistently and effectively so that future generations are 
not harmed. 
I will show that a concept of traits that any rational person1 would 
find desirable in themselves and others (whatever the situation), known 
as primary goods, is necessary to justify germ-line genetic enhance-
ments. Without primary goods, a genetic engineer is in no position to 
determine which traits should or should not be passed on to future 
generations.2 One must then create a list of universally acceptable 
primary goods and convincing evidence that germ-line genetic pro-
cedures will augment them.3 I will show that the strongest conception 
of primary goods not only fails to support germ-line enhancements, but 
provides a compelling argument against it. 
1 In lieu of a lengthy discussion on what is meant by “rational,” I will simply leave it at “one whose 
judgment is not compromised by duress, masochism, mental illness, etc.” 
2 Allhoff, 51. 
3 Allhoff, Fritz. “Germ-Line Genetic Enhancement and Rawlsian Primary Goods,” Kennedy Institute 
of Ethics Journal, vol. 15, no.1 (March 2005): 50. 
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Primary goods are difficult to enumerate given the variety of 
unexpected situations a person may encounter in life. However, those 
making decisions as to which characteristics are transmitted to progeny 
would have to comparatively evaluate the desirability of different traits.  
These decisions must be made based on primary goods. Rawls’ list of 
natural primary goods includes health, intelligence, and self-respect.4
While listing primary goods is controversial, those who have tried have 
always mentioned self-respect, which, as I will explain, is prerequisite to 
enjoying any other goods in life and is the most important primary 
good for Rawls.5
I argue that germ-line enhancements, far from promoting primary 
goods, will threaten them. I begin by making three assumptions about 
issues central to the discussion of germ-line enhancements. 1) I assume 
that germ-line genetic engineering will be capable of enhancing human 
traits. 2) I assume that the definitions of traits such as intelligence can 
be taken at face value. 3) I finally assume that germ-line enhancements 
will be distributed justly without prompting a treatment of distributive 
justice. For the purposes of this discussion I will assume an optimistic 
view of the potential of genetic engineering to enhance human traits. 
Only time will tell what is possible through genetic engineering, but at 
present it is useful to discuss the subject as if it will be nearly 
omnipotent, since that is the circumstance that grants the most com-
pelling arguments in favor of germ-line enhancement. 
 
The Argument 
To undermine germ-line genetic enhancement on the ground of 
primary goods, I first consider their existence. The most significant 
criticisms of primary goods in philosophical literature do not argue 
against the existence of primary goods, but focus on their applicability 
to theories of political justice.6 Even those who question whether a 
person might reasonably refuse some if not most primary goods still 
feel that self-worth and autonomy are universally valuable.7
4 Rawls, John.  A Theory of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 54 
5 Rawls, 386. 
6 One forceful example is John Roemer’s Theories of Distributive Justice which attacks the relationship 
between primary goods and utility, which Rawls implicitly takes as important to his theory of 
justice. 
7 It bears mentioning that too much autonomy turns into stubbornness and restrictive, reactive 
thinking.  An excess of self-respect, similarly, becomes arrogance or even delusions of grandeur.  
While it is foolish to suggest the germ-line enhancement of such traits, which are overly abundant 
in many people already, it is important to at least preserve self-respect and autonomy into the future.   
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Without a conception of primary goods, genetic engineers or 
parents could not justifiably choose which traits to pass on to offspring 
and which to eliminate. Fritz Allhoff argues that because germ-line 
enhancements will affect all future generations, we must only enhance 
those traits that are primary goods. Allhoff argues that it would be 
impermissible to enhance a non-primary good such as height because 
rational agents may prefer not to be tall, for instance, out of a desire to 
be inconspicuous in a crowd. Because rational consent is required for 
moral permissibility, it is impermissible to enhance traits that are not 
primary goods because future generations may not consent to them.   
It is worth noting the difficulty of developing a list of primary 
goods beyond health (at least a base level)8 and self-respect. These two 
are, as far as I know, universally considered to be primary goods 
because they are prior to all other goods. One cannot enjoy or use 
one’s intelligence or strength if one is bedridden or feels so worthless as 
to not view the use of one’s own talents as useful or worthwhile. Other 
seemingly obvious goods, such as intelligence, are more difficult to 
justify. Intelligence is often considered an example of a good valued by 
all, but some people would defer intellectual enhancement because they 
reasonably feel that too much academic intelligence can interfere with 
spiritual understanding, or from a desire to live a contented simple life, 
thinking that in general it may be more difficult for highly intelligent 
people to enjoy simple pleasures in life because they are always 
troubling over larger issues. This is encapsulated in the phrase 
“ignorance is bliss.” 
Germ-line genetic techniques may pose a significant threat to the 
self-respect of future generations. Rawls defines self-respect as “a 
person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his 
conception of the good, his plan in life, is worth carrying out” as well as 
the confidence to do so.9 Embedded in this definition, and certainly 
prerequisite to its fulfillment, is a notion of self-worth, the sense of 
one’s own value.  Without a sense of one’s own value, one cannot hold 
a secure conviction that one’s plan in life is worth carrying out. Self-
worth is not construed to mean arrogance, the belief that one’s life plan 
is superior to the life plans of others, but merely that one’s own 
8 Jurgen Habermas suggests that “not even the highly general good of bodily health maintains one 
and the same value within the contexts of different life histories.  Parents can’t even know 
whether a mild physical handicap may not prove in the end to be an advantage to their child” in 
The Future of Human Nature (Polity Press 2003), 86. 
9 Rawls, 386 
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conception of the good life is worth carrying out for oneself regardless 
of the various life plans that others may endeavor to fulfill. 
This crucial aspect of self-respect, as the basis of all other primary 
goods, is seriously threatened by the prospect of germ-line genetic 
enhancement.  Suppose a child is born whose parents opted to enhance 
his intelligence. Could this child help but extrapolate that, to some 
degree, his worth is based on that trait? We do not wish to say that a 
person’s worth is based on their possession or lack of certain attributes.  
Yet, that child would have been a healthy baby had his parents not 
chosen to enhance his intelligence. This means that they valued an 
intelligent baby over an unintelligent one. The child may conclude that 
his worth lies, at least in part, in his genetically engineered traits 
(regardless of the impact of his environment on these traits). Therefore 
his worth seems to lie at least in part in the hands of a geneticist. The 
more available and widespread this type of enhancement becomes, the 
more traits are likely to be enhanced in each child, and the more each 
individual child is likely to identify genetically engineered traits as 
important to his or her identity. Each child is therefore more likely to 
base his or her own self-worth on characteristics that are at least 
partially in the hands of a human engineer. According to Jurgen 
Habermas, a person’s “awareness would shift…from the performative 
attitude of a first person living her own life to the observer perspective 
which governed the intervention one’s own body was subjected to 
before birth.”10 Ultimately, the child is left to ponder whether he would 
be equally valuable and loveable were he not genetically enhanced. 
Unfortunately for the child, there seems to be reason to conclude that 
his value does lay at least partially in these enhanced traits, because his 
parents (or, improbably, the state, through his parent’s tax dollars) 
presumably had to sacrifice money (which they most likely value) in 
order to obtain these enhanced traits. 
The idea of a human craftsman influencing the traits of babies 
gives rise to another puzzling issue. Never before has a person been 
created to be a certain way. Germ-line enhanced children could struggle 
to view their talents as gifts in the traditional sense. Parents would have 
a baby genetically enhanced for their own specific reasons. Intelligence 
could no longer be viewed as gift that a child has: it instead becomes an 
attribute that he or she was made for. Such purposeful and direct 
human intervention in the makeup of a person could have drastic 
10 Habermas 53 
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effects on a self-reflective adolescent’s sense of self-worth.  If the child 
is made to be a certain way, say she was given enhanced mathematical 
abilities, is she disrespecting her parents when she chooses to be a 
carpenter?  If she chooses to be a mathematician despite her love of 
carpentry, is she disrespecting herself? Perhaps she is disrespecting 
herself as well if she chooses to be a carpenter, since she was designed 
to be a mathematician. Arguing along these same lines, Habermas adds 
that any germ-line genetic intervention done on a child “actually 
reduces the range of her future life choices” because they push a child a 
certain way without taking into account the unique circumstances that 
affect each person and make different choices more desirable. 11 
Nobody supports parents who put too much pressure on their 
children to be a certain way. It is difficult for a child to develop a sense 
of self-respect when they are repeatedly told that they are supposed to 
behave in a manner that is at odds with what the child feels inside.  
Genetic augmentations may increase this problem significantly because 
genetic techniques are an entirely different kind of influence on a child 
with more profound effects on self-worth. A non-enhanced child could 
feel that her parents only value her because she is intelligent, but the 
enhanced child’s parents valued her intelligence so much that they 
forcefully made it a part of her by changing her before she had a chance 
to refuse. A mother cannot control every environmental factor that 
contributes to her child’s development, and such factors are not always 
her intention. A child will not likely suffer an existential crisis because 
his artistic mother raised him in an artistic setting while he had a 
mathematical mind. The mother, being the person she is, tried to raise 
her child as best she could. A child is more likely to be affected by the 
mother buying germ-line enhancements for a number of reasons: (1) 
the mother now has direct and complete control over the child’s 
genetic influences, while she has only partial control over his 
environment;12 (2) this control was acquired at a cost to the mother and 
(3) the child was never given the chance to rebel, even ineffectually.  
The importance of (3) cannot be understated. While environmental 
factors may have an equal or even greater role in shaping a child than 
genetics, the child can protest his environment as it affects him. While 
these protests may not effectively mitigate the effects of the environ-
11 Habermas 80-86 
12 It is worth noting that, beyond parental nurturing and larger societal structures, a child can affect 
his own environment in a substantial way through choices in media consumption and peer 
groupings. 
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ment on the child, they allow him to declare his distaste and separate 
himself from his environment mind. At the very least, he can analyze 
his environment’s effects on him and attempt to overcome them. 
Germ-line enhancements do not allow this important ontological separ-
ation to occur in the child’s mind, and the knowledge that the parents 
paid for the procedure with the intention of creating a certain type of 
child only makes things worse, as the child must be objectively more 
valuable to the parents with the enhanced traits. In such a situation, 
declarations of unconditional love may seem unfounded.  
Fewer people would most likely object if, given some significant 
number of years after birth to develop identity, rational moral agency, 
and life experience (probably sometime in adulthood), they were given 
the option to undergo somatic cell treatments to increase intelligence. 
Many people might take the treatment without reservation, but this case 
is profoundly different from germ-line enhancement. Here, a person 
with an already formed self-awareness is being given an option to 
enhance a specific trait. The person can consider their identity and how 
this decision might affect it.  Ultimately, the person may decline the 
treatment if they feel it would be incompatible with their psyche.  In 
the case of germ-line enhancement, no such consideration is possible. 
Taken as a whole, germ-line enhancements will likely have a 
detrimental effect to the self-respect of the children affected by them. 
If self-respect is the ultimate primary good, germ-line enhancements 
can only be seen as a detriment to primary goods rather than a means 
of increasing their abundance. If primary goods don’t exist, then germ-
line procedures have no grounds upon which to be justified. Either 




Future generations cannot consent 
In an attempt to side-step a discussion of primary goods, one may 
object that people born in future generations will not exist before they 
have their genetic material and therefore we cannot talk about their 
consent as it were, because they are not around to consent until they 
are given their genetic identity. This objection also says that people 
cannot reasonably object to the genetic material that defines who they 
are because they cannot object to themselves – without the genetic 
intervention, this objection suggests, a different person would have 
been born. While our progeny may not metaphysically be able to give 
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consent for our actions, the hypothetical consent of future generations 
is necessary for germ-line enhancements. Habermas stresses that “what 
solely matters here is not the ontological status of embryo but the 
clinical attitude of the first person toward another person-however 
virtual-who, some time in the future, may encounter him in the role of 
a second person.”13 Germ-line enhancements must be done for 
progeny and not for ourselves. It would be unethical to enhance our 
offspring’s clumsiness in hopes of watching our children bumble about 
the house and crash into walls in a humorous manner. Our children 
would not be pleased with the situation, and would not have consented 
to our decision to give them the genes that made it a reality. When we 
discuss the ethics of germ-line procedures, we are clearly considering 
the welfare of future generations long after their birth.   
 
Primary goods are too stringent and genetic modification is comparable to 
environmental modification   
Some scholars, such as Colin Patrick Farrelly, have argued that 
germ-line enhancements unrelated to primary goods may be permiss-
ible.14 Farrelly attempts to use a reductio ad absurdum to disprove the 
notion that germ-line enhancements ought to only affect primary goods 
by reasoning that it would be absurd to suggest that parents may only 
introduce changes to their child’s environment that any rational agent 
would accept. Farrelly certainly succeeds in suggesting an absurd 
scenario in which parents would be unable to sign their children up for 
baseball, for instance, because a rational agent could reasonably dissent 
to playing baseball. Habermas underscores the distinction wherein “the 
parents’ choice of a genetic program for their child is associated with 
intentions…without, however, providing the addressee with an 
opportunity to take a revisionist stand.” Habermas goes on to say that 
the situation of genetic enhancement may cause an existential crisis for 
the child, a crisis in which the parents would have difficulty consoling 
the child.15 The relationship between a parent and child, while lopsided, 
is not as unbalanced as that between a genetic engineer and a patient.  
The child may well refuse a parental suggestion such as baseball, and 
the parent may likely accept the child’s decision. In fact, one could 
plausibly argue that it is impermissible for parents to try to force 
13 Habermas, 52 
14 Farrelly, Colin Patrick.  “Justice in the Genetically Transformed Society.” Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal, vol. 15, no. 1 (March 2005): 96 
15 Habermas, 51 
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children into unnecessary activities that the child clearly dissents to.  At 
the very least, anyone can agree that excessive parental pressures are to 
be discouraged. Farrelly’s analogy, then, seems to liken germ-line 
genetic enhancement at worst to a morally impermissible activity, and 
at best to poor parenting, which nobody can condone. 
It is impossible to justify providing certain goods to all future 
generations without knowing whether or not they would consent. Since 
the only goods we can be certain of consent for are primary goods, it 
would be foolhardy to provide other goods that may not be met with 
consent, and may in fact be of detriment to the well-being of future 
generations. 
 
Over-generalization of behavior 
Some may argue that I have over-generalized my case regarding the 
ways in which genetically enhanced children will evaluate their own 
worth, and I partially agree. I do not think that every child will have 
certain specific thoughts, nor do I think that they will always occur in 
childhood. Many children might thank their parents for enhancing their 
intelligence, viewing it as a tool for success and nothing more. For 
some people, self-respect is a natural state of mind. Some people, 
however, would think more deeply about the implications of their 
enhanced status, as some people are more contemplative than others. I 
do not mean to say that germ-line enhancement will cause all people to 
lose all self-respect. I do mean to say that it may cause a significant 
number people to struggle profoundly to muster up a feeling of self-
respect. Simply because a number of people (be it a large or small 
number) would object to it, germ-line enhancement cannot be justified 
by primary goods.   
 
Why not prohibit therapies as well? 
It might seem that my argument becomes muddied when applied 
to genetic therapies, and I would agree.  A base level of health is clearly 
a primary good, as without it one cannot enjoy other goods in one’s 
life. Regardless of the feasibility of the enhancement/therapy dis-
tinction, those procedures identifiable as “enhancements” do not seem 
permissible, while some “therapies” may be. Treatments that target 
specific, objectively identifiable ailments that pose severe health risks 
(such as excruciating pain and death) may be treated through germ-line 
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genetic techniques16 because consent may be assumed from the primary 
good of a base level of health. This would certainly allow treatments for 
Tay-Sachs disease, but not for all handicaps or, say, a propensity to get 
mild headaches easily. The purpose here is not to draw a bold line that 
delineates all the permissible procedures from the impermissible ones, 
but to indicate the principles by which that line must be drawn, using 
procedures and procedure types by way of example.  
 
Conclusion 
Germ-line enhancement cannot be justified without presupposing 
primary goods, all of which presuppose self-respect, which is 
significantly undermined by germ-line genetic engineering for 
enhancement. Germ-line enhancements can not promise any major 
assistance to the proliferation of this primary good. In fact, such genetic 
augmentation will have an overall damaging effect on the self-respect of 
its patients. Given that self-respect is prior to all other primary goods, it 
is impossible for one who supports primary goods to support germ-line 
engineering. As the justification of germ-line enhancements is im-
possible without appealing to primary goods, no currently existing 
system of evaluating goods confer the right to choose characteristics 
for our progeny through a planned method such as germ-line genetic 
enhancement. 
As a clarification of primary goods, it is useful to consider Rawls’ 
notion self-respect as a reference to mental health. His definition of 
self-respect certainly describes a healthy mental state that is descriptive 
of people with robust mental health and is impossible to attain without 
a sturdy psyche. If we construe health, the other primary good, to cover 
mental disabilities such as schizophrenia that may not affect self-respect 
directly, it becomes evident that there are really only two primary 
goods; a base level of mental and physical health.17 In this streamlined 
view of primary goods, germ-line therapies are permissible if they 
strengthen the primary goods of base levels of mental and physical 
health, while other procedures do not enhance either primary good, but 
instead carry immediate and long-term risks to both.   
 
16 Jennifer Feigal, in a presentation on December 12, 2005 at Macalester College. 
17 It does not seem that improving mental health to the point of an eternally sunny outlook can be 
considered a primary good, as it can be objected to as an uncritical approach to the world.  
Analogous objections can be made about overemphasis on physical health, i.e. one might not 
desire a particular type of physical fitness.  Therefore the primary goods are a base level of physical 
and mental health, such that one can pursue one’s own ends in life. 
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